Analysis of "Facts, in short, are not really facts at all" (Young 28)

I will attempt to analyze the question of what does “facts, in short, are not really facts at all” (Young 28) mean. A Fact is generally defined as “something that can be shown to be true, to exist, or to have happened” (Oxford). When I look at this definition, the first thing that comes to my mind is the word “all-inclusive”. “All –inclusive” according to the oxford dictionary means, “Including or encompassing everything that is expected or appropriate” (Oxford). From this definition of what a fact is, one could easily say that facts are a product of History. Therefore one can say whatever happens in the course of world history produces facts. In this respect, facts are and cannot be made true without an “all-Inclusive” look at whatever fact is being analyzed. In other words, in order for a fact to be valid, it is necessary for all information surrounding that fact to be analyzed. Thus, I assume that this statement reflects the idea of in-depth, collective analysis. Young points to this assumption when he states, “…the collection of evidence, and its interpretation-indicates a selection based on collective Interests” (Young 28).

When Young points out that interpretation is based on collective interests, it points to the idea that facts are not only dependent on a patriarchal position for true claims, because it seizes to be a fact given that it leaves out other perspectives, whether that be women’s or someone form a lower social standing. To summarize, not all perspectives are equal but by reducing a complex set of perspectives to a more simple ‘widely-believed’ perspective makes the nature of what a fact really is come to life. Put more specifically, fact is no longer ‘short’, because it manages to analyze a set of perspectives and then find a ground of commonality to set that fact into a structure.

Having said this, I believe that the study of religion should employ a similar method. That is, the more perspectives, ideas or experiences that are given, whether that is a woman or an outsider engaging in a religious experience to the specific culture under study, brings this idea of a fact to life. In other words, not only does the culture become more informative, but also, a more accurate portrayal of that culture is assumed. Specifically, a collective definition of what a particular religion is rather than one just from elite men makes that religion more ‘real’ and accommodating.

This brings me to the question of the relationship between embodiment and knowledge. I definitely agree with the assertion that knowledge is directly related to its type of embodiment. Embodiment is “the tangible or visible expression of an idea or quality” (Oxford), where knowledge is “a general awareness or possession of information, facts ideas, truths, or principles” (Oxford). The very fact that knowledge and embodiment is related explains why there are different perspectives on certain assumption/issues/culture/ideas. For example, a blind individual will have a different perspective on everyday life compared to a deaf person. However, what remains important is the way to analyze these different embodiments of knowledge to come to a widely believed understanding of a particular culture, symbolic object, or something as simple as a definition.

I guess this whole idea can relate to why theorists have a difficult time coming up with a definition of ‘religion’. More particular, one can understand why theorists try to come up with a definition that tries to find a common ground or framework between the religions of the world.