Once upon a time…there was a young girl named Amerilda. Amerilda was a commoner whom spent most of her time planting flowers in her garden. One day a prince from the next village offered to help her out. From the moment he gazed into her eyes they both fell in love with each other. They got married a month later and…lived happily ever after. This is an example of a fairytale common in the imagination of many of us today. In this fairytale you have the ‘perfect’ gentleman who pursues and marries a young lady besides her commonness. I have often heard comments from young ladies who state, “I believe that one day I will find a perfect gentleman”. Just recently saw a poster that illustrated the opposite. The caption read, “Women waiting for the perfect gentleman”. The illustration was skeletons sitting around a table, implying that time will run out if you wait for that ‘perfect’ gentleman. What becomes very important in my illustration is two terms: belief and faith. Before beginning my discussion by saying perfect gentleman I imply that the individual is without any flaws or errors.
Faith is something in which someone has confidence or trust but actually has to proof or evidence to support that. In this sense, young teenagers who believe that they will end up finding the ideal gentleman have faith that such a person exists, or in other words, they have faith that fairytales exist. The idea of a perfect gentleman actually existing is ridiculous because there is no way that one can actually prove that a ‘perfect’ individual actually exists. In an Islamic context the only person who is considered to be perfect is God, and yet still there is no way to prove this. Therefore, it is nothing but faith.
On the other hand, a ‘belief’ which Lopez discusses, is not the same as faith as it requires some sort of evidence or past experience to support it. The idea is that if you have no evidence at all for something then one cannot believe in it. For example, older women who have had experience dating men will actually believe that there really is no perfect gentleman that exists based on their experience. In other words, someone’s experience can become evidential because one can prove whether or not such a gentleman exists by having multiple partners. Of course belief does not deal with any certainties, in the event that finding a perfect gentleman may be likely, but the chances are slim to none.
So the question is then, how does this relate to religion? I believe that religious belief should be reinterpreted to religious faith. There is no evidence at all that supports the “truth” of religion. In other words, any attempt to put ‘truth’ to any religious material is always contested which goes against claims of ‘truth’. In other words, there in ‘truth’ unless there is physical evidence that support such claims.
However, there are some who claim that they have personal experiences with God and therefore they have evidence so it is belief. I will argue the opposite because there still needs to be some evidential dimension. In this light, personal experience that cannot be proven loses all claims in believing in something. If belief was totally based on personal experiences then any ordinary person can claim that they communicate with God can argue that their belief is a valid one, even though the opposite is true.
Ultimately, religion is a constructed phenomenon that should not be directly equated with belief but rather with faith.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Discussion of "The Rhetoric of Experience"
Sharf thinks of the mind as a “sort of inner space in which the outer material world is reflected or re-represented”. In this sense he argues that the mind is separate from the world in some way because there is no evidence to suggest that events in the mind point to anything beyond the inner realm. In this light, he argues that religion was never presented with inner experiences but always with culturally conditioned texts, narratives or rituals. Therefore, our knowledge of religion is not of inner experiences that require being interpreted.
His argument totally discredits the mind as a tool for understanding ones own mental states, such as intent, knowledge and beliefs… In other words, Sharf’s argument alludes to the idea that the mind is incapable of fully functioning without living in the material world as seen through his ‘alien case’ in which he separates the experiential element from narrative. In this light, narratives based on experience “do not faithfully represent actual historical occurrences”.
This leads me to questioning if anyone truly understands how experience is played out in the mind. In this view, if one cannot fully prove that experience takes place in the mind, then how could one prove that religion exists? In other words, religion which is primarily based on religious experience becomes void because according to shaft there is no evidence that inner mental events point to anything beyond themselves. In this case, not only does the mind become a functionless tool, but also history that relies on experience of events becomes nonexistent. Isn’t knowledge itself reliant on how one acts in the world. Meaning knowledge and experience directly imply one another, so how can something have a ‘real’ aspect to it if one has not experienced it?
In this case, we understand the mind as knowledge gained through experience. In which experience is related to multiple meanings due to the fact that my experience will mean something different than someone else’s experience of the same thing. It does not mean to say that experience produces truth, but that ‘truth’ can be reached through experience. More specifically, I will give a concrete example of where I am going. If Larry and Tom both drink excessive amounts of alcohol, their experiences of alcohol would be totally different, in the way that alcohol would affect control over themselves (one may be able to control themselves better than the other) however, through this experience the ‘truth’ becomes that if they both continue at their rate of drinking, they would both be diagnosed with serious diseases down the road.
I address religious experience the same way. For example, two practitioners may have totally different ways of expressing the meaning of religious experience, but the ‘truth’ or what remains important is not so much the interpretations of experience, but the end goal of ‘wholeness’ through being pious. Ultimately what I am trying to say here is that experience is important in producing some kind of truth.
Sharf’s position is the opposite, in which he says that experience seizes to exist because different meanings are brought out by religious experience in a way that it can’t be proved. Therefore, what remains important is how the mind reflects the material world and not what the mind experiences in the material world. In other words, his take is that to remember something is to retell it with material words in this world, so the actual ‘truth’ is the retelling not the experience/thought process in our minds. I on the other hand believe that experience plays an important role or has an important dimension to how we act in the world and to our discourse of religious studies.
His argument totally discredits the mind as a tool for understanding ones own mental states, such as intent, knowledge and beliefs… In other words, Sharf’s argument alludes to the idea that the mind is incapable of fully functioning without living in the material world as seen through his ‘alien case’ in which he separates the experiential element from narrative. In this light, narratives based on experience “do not faithfully represent actual historical occurrences”.
This leads me to questioning if anyone truly understands how experience is played out in the mind. In this view, if one cannot fully prove that experience takes place in the mind, then how could one prove that religion exists? In other words, religion which is primarily based on religious experience becomes void because according to shaft there is no evidence that inner mental events point to anything beyond themselves. In this case, not only does the mind become a functionless tool, but also history that relies on experience of events becomes nonexistent. Isn’t knowledge itself reliant on how one acts in the world. Meaning knowledge and experience directly imply one another, so how can something have a ‘real’ aspect to it if one has not experienced it?
In this case, we understand the mind as knowledge gained through experience. In which experience is related to multiple meanings due to the fact that my experience will mean something different than someone else’s experience of the same thing. It does not mean to say that experience produces truth, but that ‘truth’ can be reached through experience. More specifically, I will give a concrete example of where I am going. If Larry and Tom both drink excessive amounts of alcohol, their experiences of alcohol would be totally different, in the way that alcohol would affect control over themselves (one may be able to control themselves better than the other) however, through this experience the ‘truth’ becomes that if they both continue at their rate of drinking, they would both be diagnosed with serious diseases down the road.
I address religious experience the same way. For example, two practitioners may have totally different ways of expressing the meaning of religious experience, but the ‘truth’ or what remains important is not so much the interpretations of experience, but the end goal of ‘wholeness’ through being pious. Ultimately what I am trying to say here is that experience is important in producing some kind of truth.
Sharf’s position is the opposite, in which he says that experience seizes to exist because different meanings are brought out by religious experience in a way that it can’t be proved. Therefore, what remains important is how the mind reflects the material world and not what the mind experiences in the material world. In other words, his take is that to remember something is to retell it with material words in this world, so the actual ‘truth’ is the retelling not the experience/thought process in our minds. I on the other hand believe that experience plays an important role or has an important dimension to how we act in the world and to our discourse of religious studies.
Monday, October 8, 2007
Analysis of "Facts, in short, are not really facts at all" (Young 28)
I will attempt to analyze the question of what does “facts, in short, are not really facts at all” (Young 28) mean. A Fact is generally defined as “something that can be shown to be true, to exist, or to have happened” (Oxford). When I look at this definition, the first thing that comes to my mind is the word “all-inclusive”. “All –inclusive” according to the oxford dictionary means, “Including or encompassing everything that is expected or appropriate” (Oxford). From this definition of what a fact is, one could easily say that facts are a product of History. Therefore one can say whatever happens in the course of world history produces facts. In this respect, facts are and cannot be made true without an “all-Inclusive” look at whatever fact is being analyzed. In other words, in order for a fact to be valid, it is necessary for all information surrounding that fact to be analyzed. Thus, I assume that this statement reflects the idea of in-depth, collective analysis. Young points to this assumption when he states, “…the collection of evidence, and its interpretation-indicates a selection based on collective Interests” (Young 28).
When Young points out that interpretation is based on collective interests, it points to the idea that facts are not only dependent on a patriarchal position for true claims, because it seizes to be a fact given that it leaves out other perspectives, whether that be women’s or someone form a lower social standing. To summarize, not all perspectives are equal but by reducing a complex set of perspectives to a more simple ‘widely-believed’ perspective makes the nature of what a fact really is come to life. Put more specifically, fact is no longer ‘short’, because it manages to analyze a set of perspectives and then find a ground of commonality to set that fact into a structure.
Having said this, I believe that the study of religion should employ a similar method. That is, the more perspectives, ideas or experiences that are given, whether that is a woman or an outsider engaging in a religious experience to the specific culture under study, brings this idea of a fact to life. In other words, not only does the culture become more informative, but also, a more accurate portrayal of that culture is assumed. Specifically, a collective definition of what a particular religion is rather than one just from elite men makes that religion more ‘real’ and accommodating.
This brings me to the question of the relationship between embodiment and knowledge. I definitely agree with the assertion that knowledge is directly related to its type of embodiment. Embodiment is “the tangible or visible expression of an idea or quality” (Oxford), where knowledge is “a general awareness or possession of information, facts ideas, truths, or principles” (Oxford). The very fact that knowledge and embodiment is related explains why there are different perspectives on certain assumption/issues/culture/ideas. For example, a blind individual will have a different perspective on everyday life compared to a deaf person. However, what remains important is the way to analyze these different embodiments of knowledge to come to a widely believed understanding of a particular culture, symbolic object, or something as simple as a definition.
I guess this whole idea can relate to why theorists have a difficult time coming up with a definition of ‘religion’. More particular, one can understand why theorists try to come up with a definition that tries to find a common ground or framework between the religions of the world.
When Young points out that interpretation is based on collective interests, it points to the idea that facts are not only dependent on a patriarchal position for true claims, because it seizes to be a fact given that it leaves out other perspectives, whether that be women’s or someone form a lower social standing. To summarize, not all perspectives are equal but by reducing a complex set of perspectives to a more simple ‘widely-believed’ perspective makes the nature of what a fact really is come to life. Put more specifically, fact is no longer ‘short’, because it manages to analyze a set of perspectives and then find a ground of commonality to set that fact into a structure.
Having said this, I believe that the study of religion should employ a similar method. That is, the more perspectives, ideas or experiences that are given, whether that is a woman or an outsider engaging in a religious experience to the specific culture under study, brings this idea of a fact to life. In other words, not only does the culture become more informative, but also, a more accurate portrayal of that culture is assumed. Specifically, a collective definition of what a particular religion is rather than one just from elite men makes that religion more ‘real’ and accommodating.
This brings me to the question of the relationship between embodiment and knowledge. I definitely agree with the assertion that knowledge is directly related to its type of embodiment. Embodiment is “the tangible or visible expression of an idea or quality” (Oxford), where knowledge is “a general awareness or possession of information, facts ideas, truths, or principles” (Oxford). The very fact that knowledge and embodiment is related explains why there are different perspectives on certain assumption/issues/culture/ideas. For example, a blind individual will have a different perspective on everyday life compared to a deaf person. However, what remains important is the way to analyze these different embodiments of knowledge to come to a widely believed understanding of a particular culture, symbolic object, or something as simple as a definition.
I guess this whole idea can relate to why theorists have a difficult time coming up with a definition of ‘religion’. More particular, one can understand why theorists try to come up with a definition that tries to find a common ground or framework between the religions of the world.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)