1. I was researching syllabi, and I came across some that were simplistic in its forms and some that were detailed. Most of the topics were interdisciplinary in focusing on methods and theories in Psychology, sociology, anthropology, phenomenology etc….This syllabus was vast and very detailed. It outlines the aims of the course and the strict rubric the class must adhere too. Also, I was very shocked to see that there were actually exams for a class so heavily centered on discussion. I was wondering judging from our class, how the teacher was going to justify her marking knowing that multiple meanings can come out of readings. It is shocking to know that this was just a 200 level course, meant to be an introduction to religious studies. I like the fact that it kind of gives a background for the course. I don’t like some of the topics. I think themes are better to focus on for purpose of doing justice to course material.
The site: http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca
2. This is a more condense syllabus, with its focus on more terms we have discussed. Critical terms reader we used in our class covers a large amount of the classes. Emphasis is given to close readings of articles and class discussions. This one is more focused on themes and the amount of readings assigned per class are reasonable for a lose reading of material.
The Site: http://classes.colgate.edu/
3. This syllabus required more writing assignments. From the list of books that are required for the class is focused around theories more than methods. The additional readings (judging from the title) do give background information about methods. What I really like about this syllabus is that it requires the student to do interviews with faculty members from a different department. This is interesting in learning about the interdisciplinary dialogue, as discussed last week.
The Site: http://www.clas.ufl.edu/
4. This syllabus also focuses on Theorists, but there is a heavy weight of books dealing with methods on it as well. This is a program designed for students doing their Master. It focuses on research and class presentations. The good think about this presentation is it allows the class to lead discussion and promotes a better understanding of a particular theme. Although this is very time consuming. I guess that is why it is a Master’s program. I think it would be a lot harder for undergrads.
The Site: http://web.utk.edu
Monday, December 3, 2007
Monday, November 26, 2007
Interdisciplinary
Callanan asserts her root argument as, “the ideological destruction of the political affected by liberal philosophy provided the necessary background for an ideology of professionalism which based legitimate social power on the foundations of private monopolies of expert knowledge”(7). Her argument goes hand in hand with my experience of taking Hinduism courses at the University of Toronto, this of course being my area of specialist. However, it was surprising to hear that, when a student raised her hand and related to her experience to validate her point, the professor interrupted and said this course has nothing to with how people practice at home but instead with historical evidence. Therefore, not only was the student’s experience pushed to the side, but also, her attitude affirms that there is no knowledge outside the expert. In other words, she proved that her ‘socail power was [based on a] monopoly of expert knowledge. In this regard, there was no room for any assertions that were based on experience if it was not conjured up by a specialist. Just like one who wants to know the reasoning and method behind a math formula will consult a specialist or mathematician rather than a scientist.
Thus, as mentioned there is an area of specialty that needs to addressed when consulting a person with questions that need validated answers. In this respect, there needs to be a specialist at all times. It is however, not impossible for a person to specialize in two fields, but this means extensive education and one rarely goes through this process. In this light, I agree with Callanan’s assertion that, “expertise without the elements of curiosity and relationship, is a trap” (9). In other words, there needs to be discourse from other disciplines in order for a broadening of information and knowledge on particular topics. In this regard “flexibility, creativity, and curiosity can be beneficial to a particular subject under discussion only is there are people who are from different bodies of expertise.
For example, study of a particular religious text would call upon different bodies of expertise to come to a consensus on the actual meanings of the text. Without one body of expertise the text lacks a full analysis as evident in my discussion of the Quran last week.
What is important to note in Callanan’s discussion of discourse though is how closely it relates to Said’s ‘clash of definitions’. According to Said, this means that cultures are always in the process of redefining their identities at a given time and place in history and in relation to others. This can be applied to this as disciplines are always in a process of redefining their ‘correctness’ at a given time and place in history and in relation to others. In this regard, disciplines when in the face of one another are in constant conversation about what is the right way of approaching a particular discipline at a particular time in history.
This approach however, in my training as a scholar is rarely used, because as a student, we rely on the expertise to exercise their knowledge, not questioning or bringing into dialogue our own curiosity and how it might relate. This method can have both a positive and negative take. On the first hand, it can encourage a greater understanding of a topic, leading to harmony and integration of disciplines, and therefore as Callanan puts it makes us “smart, responsible, ethical and complex citizens” (5). On the other hand, dialogue can create stronger boundaries that emphasize even more this relationship of us vs. them. More specifically, in trying to reach consensus boundaries might be resurrected to emphasize why the disciplines are separate in the first place. however, what remains important is the fact that greater knowledge that can relate to social contexts is best achieved through dialogue.
Thus, as mentioned there is an area of specialty that needs to addressed when consulting a person with questions that need validated answers. In this respect, there needs to be a specialist at all times. It is however, not impossible for a person to specialize in two fields, but this means extensive education and one rarely goes through this process. In this light, I agree with Callanan’s assertion that, “expertise without the elements of curiosity and relationship, is a trap” (9). In other words, there needs to be discourse from other disciplines in order for a broadening of information and knowledge on particular topics. In this regard “flexibility, creativity, and curiosity can be beneficial to a particular subject under discussion only is there are people who are from different bodies of expertise.
For example, study of a particular religious text would call upon different bodies of expertise to come to a consensus on the actual meanings of the text. Without one body of expertise the text lacks a full analysis as evident in my discussion of the Quran last week.
What is important to note in Callanan’s discussion of discourse though is how closely it relates to Said’s ‘clash of definitions’. According to Said, this means that cultures are always in the process of redefining their identities at a given time and place in history and in relation to others. This can be applied to this as disciplines are always in a process of redefining their ‘correctness’ at a given time and place in history and in relation to others. In this regard, disciplines when in the face of one another are in constant conversation about what is the right way of approaching a particular discipline at a particular time in history.
This approach however, in my training as a scholar is rarely used, because as a student, we rely on the expertise to exercise their knowledge, not questioning or bringing into dialogue our own curiosity and how it might relate. This method can have both a positive and negative take. On the first hand, it can encourage a greater understanding of a topic, leading to harmony and integration of disciplines, and therefore as Callanan puts it makes us “smart, responsible, ethical and complex citizens” (5). On the other hand, dialogue can create stronger boundaries that emphasize even more this relationship of us vs. them. More specifically, in trying to reach consensus boundaries might be resurrected to emphasize why the disciplines are separate in the first place. however, what remains important is the fact that greater knowledge that can relate to social contexts is best achieved through dialogue.
Monday, November 12, 2007
Contextualism
What strikes me in my studies of religion the most is this problem of contextualism. In chapter seven of Clark’s book he addresses skinner’s understanding of ‘context’. He outlines, “[Skinner] privileges linguistic, generic, and ideological contexts, attempting to ascertain the range of meanings that particular words would have conveyed to the people of the society in which the text was produced”. In outlining the ways in which I agree with this assertion for the rest of my discussion I would look more closely at the Quran as a text.
To Muslims the preservation of the Quran implies a direct relationship to who interprets it. In other words, the question here is who has the authority to interpret the Quran? Many Muslims would agree on the fact that the person who is bestowed with such a privilege of interpreting the Quran is one who is well learned. Put more precisely, the person who gets to interpret the Quran is one who has mastered several disciplines. He is the one who is a musician, knows aspects of law, a theologian, knows rhetoric, grammar, mythology, the Hadith, is very pious etc… What remains important here is that the Quran is to be interpreted by someone who can dissect the text in its original form, to allow the tradition to speak for itself. The key to understanding the Quran is not only language (Arabic) but also, the ‘context’.
More precisely, when western scholars interpreted the Quran, they were criticized for their misrepresentations. This was mainly because most scholars were not versed in the language of the book, so the context in which they were interpreting the text was misrepresented. For example, scholars tended to interpret the Quran through a chronological method because that was the way history was understood. However, the Quran was not compiled chronologically so to apply such a method to understanding the Quran would seem irrational to many Muslims. As skinner puts it, “what are the authors doing?” or “where is the linguistic action?” becomes the central focus. To put it more simply, a word can have different meanings, but the meaning should imply a direct relationship to the context in which it is used. For example if I say to someone “don’t forget me when you are marking the tests”, ‘forget’ can have many meanings it can mean to not put me out of your mind, or in this context, remember me when you are marking the tests.
Keeping this in mind, Muslims also interpret the Quran with specific references to social, economic, and political circumstances. For example, there are many stories in the Quran that are told based on the assumption that the audience already have some background knowledge of that particular story. What is important here is that there is a background force that works together with linguistics in guiding one to the right interpretations. For example, in the Quran there is a verse that states, “They forgot God, but God forgot them”. In this light, the context in which this should be interpreted is theological. In the theological sense, God cannot forget because his divineness presupposes that he is all knowing. Therefore, one who knows little about theology could not make such a sound interpretation.
In conclusion, interpreting any text calls for an informed opinion not an unformed opinion. To illustrate, if one wants a more accurate description of a particular religion they would consult a religious practitioner, just as one who wants a proper diagnosis of their illness will consult a doctor. It all boils down to the fact that an informed opinion depends on the author’s background and their field of specialty. One would not regard an anthropologist making claims on scientific matters more rational than a scientist making the same claims.
To Muslims the preservation of the Quran implies a direct relationship to who interprets it. In other words, the question here is who has the authority to interpret the Quran? Many Muslims would agree on the fact that the person who is bestowed with such a privilege of interpreting the Quran is one who is well learned. Put more precisely, the person who gets to interpret the Quran is one who has mastered several disciplines. He is the one who is a musician, knows aspects of law, a theologian, knows rhetoric, grammar, mythology, the Hadith, is very pious etc… What remains important here is that the Quran is to be interpreted by someone who can dissect the text in its original form, to allow the tradition to speak for itself. The key to understanding the Quran is not only language (Arabic) but also, the ‘context’.
More precisely, when western scholars interpreted the Quran, they were criticized for their misrepresentations. This was mainly because most scholars were not versed in the language of the book, so the context in which they were interpreting the text was misrepresented. For example, scholars tended to interpret the Quran through a chronological method because that was the way history was understood. However, the Quran was not compiled chronologically so to apply such a method to understanding the Quran would seem irrational to many Muslims. As skinner puts it, “what are the authors doing?” or “where is the linguistic action?” becomes the central focus. To put it more simply, a word can have different meanings, but the meaning should imply a direct relationship to the context in which it is used. For example if I say to someone “don’t forget me when you are marking the tests”, ‘forget’ can have many meanings it can mean to not put me out of your mind, or in this context, remember me when you are marking the tests.
Keeping this in mind, Muslims also interpret the Quran with specific references to social, economic, and political circumstances. For example, there are many stories in the Quran that are told based on the assumption that the audience already have some background knowledge of that particular story. What is important here is that there is a background force that works together with linguistics in guiding one to the right interpretations. For example, in the Quran there is a verse that states, “They forgot God, but God forgot them”. In this light, the context in which this should be interpreted is theological. In the theological sense, God cannot forget because his divineness presupposes that he is all knowing. Therefore, one who knows little about theology could not make such a sound interpretation.
In conclusion, interpreting any text calls for an informed opinion not an unformed opinion. To illustrate, if one wants a more accurate description of a particular religion they would consult a religious practitioner, just as one who wants a proper diagnosis of their illness will consult a doctor. It all boils down to the fact that an informed opinion depends on the author’s background and their field of specialty. One would not regard an anthropologist making claims on scientific matters more rational than a scientist making the same claims.
Monday, November 5, 2007
Emotion
Most religious practitioners accept as ‘true’ their religious beliefs. In other words, most religious believers will argue that their beliefs are rational. What is rational to the practitioner can easily be denounced as being irrational by a non-believer. With regards to our readings on emotion this week, emotion stems this common debate between Universalism on one hand and Cultural relativism on the other. The former aims to find a common explanation of emotion which can be applicable to ‘world religions’, whereas the latter aims to, “support the cultural construction of emotion, the distinctiveness of local and even personal emotional experiences and styles”. The nineteenth century saw the beginning of many religions through the eyes of European scholars. Due to this, many religious practices that did not fit into a universal ideal of scientific ‘Truth’ was dismissed as being irrational. Corrigan argues that if religion was to be explained in these terms there would be no room for “religious studies professors”. He further says that a very important component of religion that should be studied is emotion, something that can’t be proved and is thus, irrational. However, given how strongly religion typically appeals to emotional values as opposed to intellectual values, don’t believers think that emotional reasons for belief are valid or worthy?
Emotions are said to be accompanied by bodily responses (racing heart, sweaty palms, tense muscles etc…) in which we can sense what is going on inside our body much the same way we can sense what is going on in the outside world. These bodily sensations that one feels is a response to different emotions. For example, during the exam period, some students experience intense muscles and ‘butterflies’ in their stomachs due to stress/anxiety. In this respect our states of mind internally reflect the emotions that we reveal. For instance, students are not stressed because of intense muscles, but have intense muscles because they are stressed. Another example is: people don’t cry because they feel sad, they are sad because they cry.
In this regard, emotion is a very important dimension in religion. In most religions that I have studied emotions plays a key role in differentiating an exceptional practitioner from a practitioner. More precisely, in Hinduism a very key path that is practiced by many Hindus is bhakti yoga or the path of devotion. This path was established to include all peoples regardless of their status or class distinction in society. This path is the easiest of the four paths to reach the main goal of liberation. The practitioner becomes one with god through unconditionally loving him/her. In other words emotions that are felt by humans should be expressed only towards the lord. Such emotions as jealousy should be directed towards the lord. One tries to maximize their emotions towards God, the ultimate idea is to refine negative emotions of jealousy to the most positive which is love. In this context, the individual becomes more and more in tune with God through refining bad emotions/feelings.
Thus, in such a religion emotion becomes the ground for determining the ‘truth’/ worth of Hindu belief. In other words, Hindus who practice this path hold to the assumption that these emotions are what create this inner purity. This to them is how one attains ‘true’ knowledge and is then liberated from the cycle of rebirths. How can one dismiss this aspect of Hinduism as something irrational, if to the believer it is totally rational? In this light, one can clearly see that emotions are reason for belief over intellectual values. Thus, a lot more can be learned about ‘world religions’ through studying things that appear to be ambiguous, such as belief, experience and emotion.
Emotions are said to be accompanied by bodily responses (racing heart, sweaty palms, tense muscles etc…) in which we can sense what is going on inside our body much the same way we can sense what is going on in the outside world. These bodily sensations that one feels is a response to different emotions. For example, during the exam period, some students experience intense muscles and ‘butterflies’ in their stomachs due to stress/anxiety. In this respect our states of mind internally reflect the emotions that we reveal. For instance, students are not stressed because of intense muscles, but have intense muscles because they are stressed. Another example is: people don’t cry because they feel sad, they are sad because they cry.
In this regard, emotion is a very important dimension in religion. In most religions that I have studied emotions plays a key role in differentiating an exceptional practitioner from a practitioner. More precisely, in Hinduism a very key path that is practiced by many Hindus is bhakti yoga or the path of devotion. This path was established to include all peoples regardless of their status or class distinction in society. This path is the easiest of the four paths to reach the main goal of liberation. The practitioner becomes one with god through unconditionally loving him/her. In other words emotions that are felt by humans should be expressed only towards the lord. Such emotions as jealousy should be directed towards the lord. One tries to maximize their emotions towards God, the ultimate idea is to refine negative emotions of jealousy to the most positive which is love. In this context, the individual becomes more and more in tune with God through refining bad emotions/feelings.
Thus, in such a religion emotion becomes the ground for determining the ‘truth’/ worth of Hindu belief. In other words, Hindus who practice this path hold to the assumption that these emotions are what create this inner purity. This to them is how one attains ‘true’ knowledge and is then liberated from the cycle of rebirths. How can one dismiss this aspect of Hinduism as something irrational, if to the believer it is totally rational? In this light, one can clearly see that emotions are reason for belief over intellectual values. Thus, a lot more can be learned about ‘world religions’ through studying things that appear to be ambiguous, such as belief, experience and emotion.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Belief or Faith?
Once upon a time…there was a young girl named Amerilda. Amerilda was a commoner whom spent most of her time planting flowers in her garden. One day a prince from the next village offered to help her out. From the moment he gazed into her eyes they both fell in love with each other. They got married a month later and…lived happily ever after. This is an example of a fairytale common in the imagination of many of us today. In this fairytale you have the ‘perfect’ gentleman who pursues and marries a young lady besides her commonness. I have often heard comments from young ladies who state, “I believe that one day I will find a perfect gentleman”. Just recently saw a poster that illustrated the opposite. The caption read, “Women waiting for the perfect gentleman”. The illustration was skeletons sitting around a table, implying that time will run out if you wait for that ‘perfect’ gentleman. What becomes very important in my illustration is two terms: belief and faith. Before beginning my discussion by saying perfect gentleman I imply that the individual is without any flaws or errors.
Faith is something in which someone has confidence or trust but actually has to proof or evidence to support that. In this sense, young teenagers who believe that they will end up finding the ideal gentleman have faith that such a person exists, or in other words, they have faith that fairytales exist. The idea of a perfect gentleman actually existing is ridiculous because there is no way that one can actually prove that a ‘perfect’ individual actually exists. In an Islamic context the only person who is considered to be perfect is God, and yet still there is no way to prove this. Therefore, it is nothing but faith.
On the other hand, a ‘belief’ which Lopez discusses, is not the same as faith as it requires some sort of evidence or past experience to support it. The idea is that if you have no evidence at all for something then one cannot believe in it. For example, older women who have had experience dating men will actually believe that there really is no perfect gentleman that exists based on their experience. In other words, someone’s experience can become evidential because one can prove whether or not such a gentleman exists by having multiple partners. Of course belief does not deal with any certainties, in the event that finding a perfect gentleman may be likely, but the chances are slim to none.
So the question is then, how does this relate to religion? I believe that religious belief should be reinterpreted to religious faith. There is no evidence at all that supports the “truth” of religion. In other words, any attempt to put ‘truth’ to any religious material is always contested which goes against claims of ‘truth’. In other words, there in ‘truth’ unless there is physical evidence that support such claims.
However, there are some who claim that they have personal experiences with God and therefore they have evidence so it is belief. I will argue the opposite because there still needs to be some evidential dimension. In this light, personal experience that cannot be proven loses all claims in believing in something. If belief was totally based on personal experiences then any ordinary person can claim that they communicate with God can argue that their belief is a valid one, even though the opposite is true.
Ultimately, religion is a constructed phenomenon that should not be directly equated with belief but rather with faith.
Faith is something in which someone has confidence or trust but actually has to proof or evidence to support that. In this sense, young teenagers who believe that they will end up finding the ideal gentleman have faith that such a person exists, or in other words, they have faith that fairytales exist. The idea of a perfect gentleman actually existing is ridiculous because there is no way that one can actually prove that a ‘perfect’ individual actually exists. In an Islamic context the only person who is considered to be perfect is God, and yet still there is no way to prove this. Therefore, it is nothing but faith.
On the other hand, a ‘belief’ which Lopez discusses, is not the same as faith as it requires some sort of evidence or past experience to support it. The idea is that if you have no evidence at all for something then one cannot believe in it. For example, older women who have had experience dating men will actually believe that there really is no perfect gentleman that exists based on their experience. In other words, someone’s experience can become evidential because one can prove whether or not such a gentleman exists by having multiple partners. Of course belief does not deal with any certainties, in the event that finding a perfect gentleman may be likely, but the chances are slim to none.
So the question is then, how does this relate to religion? I believe that religious belief should be reinterpreted to religious faith. There is no evidence at all that supports the “truth” of religion. In other words, any attempt to put ‘truth’ to any religious material is always contested which goes against claims of ‘truth’. In other words, there in ‘truth’ unless there is physical evidence that support such claims.
However, there are some who claim that they have personal experiences with God and therefore they have evidence so it is belief. I will argue the opposite because there still needs to be some evidential dimension. In this light, personal experience that cannot be proven loses all claims in believing in something. If belief was totally based on personal experiences then any ordinary person can claim that they communicate with God can argue that their belief is a valid one, even though the opposite is true.
Ultimately, religion is a constructed phenomenon that should not be directly equated with belief but rather with faith.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Discussion of "The Rhetoric of Experience"
Sharf thinks of the mind as a “sort of inner space in which the outer material world is reflected or re-represented”. In this sense he argues that the mind is separate from the world in some way because there is no evidence to suggest that events in the mind point to anything beyond the inner realm. In this light, he argues that religion was never presented with inner experiences but always with culturally conditioned texts, narratives or rituals. Therefore, our knowledge of religion is not of inner experiences that require being interpreted.
His argument totally discredits the mind as a tool for understanding ones own mental states, such as intent, knowledge and beliefs… In other words, Sharf’s argument alludes to the idea that the mind is incapable of fully functioning without living in the material world as seen through his ‘alien case’ in which he separates the experiential element from narrative. In this light, narratives based on experience “do not faithfully represent actual historical occurrences”.
This leads me to questioning if anyone truly understands how experience is played out in the mind. In this view, if one cannot fully prove that experience takes place in the mind, then how could one prove that religion exists? In other words, religion which is primarily based on religious experience becomes void because according to shaft there is no evidence that inner mental events point to anything beyond themselves. In this case, not only does the mind become a functionless tool, but also history that relies on experience of events becomes nonexistent. Isn’t knowledge itself reliant on how one acts in the world. Meaning knowledge and experience directly imply one another, so how can something have a ‘real’ aspect to it if one has not experienced it?
In this case, we understand the mind as knowledge gained through experience. In which experience is related to multiple meanings due to the fact that my experience will mean something different than someone else’s experience of the same thing. It does not mean to say that experience produces truth, but that ‘truth’ can be reached through experience. More specifically, I will give a concrete example of where I am going. If Larry and Tom both drink excessive amounts of alcohol, their experiences of alcohol would be totally different, in the way that alcohol would affect control over themselves (one may be able to control themselves better than the other) however, through this experience the ‘truth’ becomes that if they both continue at their rate of drinking, they would both be diagnosed with serious diseases down the road.
I address religious experience the same way. For example, two practitioners may have totally different ways of expressing the meaning of religious experience, but the ‘truth’ or what remains important is not so much the interpretations of experience, but the end goal of ‘wholeness’ through being pious. Ultimately what I am trying to say here is that experience is important in producing some kind of truth.
Sharf’s position is the opposite, in which he says that experience seizes to exist because different meanings are brought out by religious experience in a way that it can’t be proved. Therefore, what remains important is how the mind reflects the material world and not what the mind experiences in the material world. In other words, his take is that to remember something is to retell it with material words in this world, so the actual ‘truth’ is the retelling not the experience/thought process in our minds. I on the other hand believe that experience plays an important role or has an important dimension to how we act in the world and to our discourse of religious studies.
His argument totally discredits the mind as a tool for understanding ones own mental states, such as intent, knowledge and beliefs… In other words, Sharf’s argument alludes to the idea that the mind is incapable of fully functioning without living in the material world as seen through his ‘alien case’ in which he separates the experiential element from narrative. In this light, narratives based on experience “do not faithfully represent actual historical occurrences”.
This leads me to questioning if anyone truly understands how experience is played out in the mind. In this view, if one cannot fully prove that experience takes place in the mind, then how could one prove that religion exists? In other words, religion which is primarily based on religious experience becomes void because according to shaft there is no evidence that inner mental events point to anything beyond themselves. In this case, not only does the mind become a functionless tool, but also history that relies on experience of events becomes nonexistent. Isn’t knowledge itself reliant on how one acts in the world. Meaning knowledge and experience directly imply one another, so how can something have a ‘real’ aspect to it if one has not experienced it?
In this case, we understand the mind as knowledge gained through experience. In which experience is related to multiple meanings due to the fact that my experience will mean something different than someone else’s experience of the same thing. It does not mean to say that experience produces truth, but that ‘truth’ can be reached through experience. More specifically, I will give a concrete example of where I am going. If Larry and Tom both drink excessive amounts of alcohol, their experiences of alcohol would be totally different, in the way that alcohol would affect control over themselves (one may be able to control themselves better than the other) however, through this experience the ‘truth’ becomes that if they both continue at their rate of drinking, they would both be diagnosed with serious diseases down the road.
I address religious experience the same way. For example, two practitioners may have totally different ways of expressing the meaning of religious experience, but the ‘truth’ or what remains important is not so much the interpretations of experience, but the end goal of ‘wholeness’ through being pious. Ultimately what I am trying to say here is that experience is important in producing some kind of truth.
Sharf’s position is the opposite, in which he says that experience seizes to exist because different meanings are brought out by religious experience in a way that it can’t be proved. Therefore, what remains important is how the mind reflects the material world and not what the mind experiences in the material world. In other words, his take is that to remember something is to retell it with material words in this world, so the actual ‘truth’ is the retelling not the experience/thought process in our minds. I on the other hand believe that experience plays an important role or has an important dimension to how we act in the world and to our discourse of religious studies.
Monday, October 8, 2007
Analysis of "Facts, in short, are not really facts at all" (Young 28)
I will attempt to analyze the question of what does “facts, in short, are not really facts at all” (Young 28) mean. A Fact is generally defined as “something that can be shown to be true, to exist, or to have happened” (Oxford). When I look at this definition, the first thing that comes to my mind is the word “all-inclusive”. “All –inclusive” according to the oxford dictionary means, “Including or encompassing everything that is expected or appropriate” (Oxford). From this definition of what a fact is, one could easily say that facts are a product of History. Therefore one can say whatever happens in the course of world history produces facts. In this respect, facts are and cannot be made true without an “all-Inclusive” look at whatever fact is being analyzed. In other words, in order for a fact to be valid, it is necessary for all information surrounding that fact to be analyzed. Thus, I assume that this statement reflects the idea of in-depth, collective analysis. Young points to this assumption when he states, “…the collection of evidence, and its interpretation-indicates a selection based on collective Interests” (Young 28).
When Young points out that interpretation is based on collective interests, it points to the idea that facts are not only dependent on a patriarchal position for true claims, because it seizes to be a fact given that it leaves out other perspectives, whether that be women’s or someone form a lower social standing. To summarize, not all perspectives are equal but by reducing a complex set of perspectives to a more simple ‘widely-believed’ perspective makes the nature of what a fact really is come to life. Put more specifically, fact is no longer ‘short’, because it manages to analyze a set of perspectives and then find a ground of commonality to set that fact into a structure.
Having said this, I believe that the study of religion should employ a similar method. That is, the more perspectives, ideas or experiences that are given, whether that is a woman or an outsider engaging in a religious experience to the specific culture under study, brings this idea of a fact to life. In other words, not only does the culture become more informative, but also, a more accurate portrayal of that culture is assumed. Specifically, a collective definition of what a particular religion is rather than one just from elite men makes that religion more ‘real’ and accommodating.
This brings me to the question of the relationship between embodiment and knowledge. I definitely agree with the assertion that knowledge is directly related to its type of embodiment. Embodiment is “the tangible or visible expression of an idea or quality” (Oxford), where knowledge is “a general awareness or possession of information, facts ideas, truths, or principles” (Oxford). The very fact that knowledge and embodiment is related explains why there are different perspectives on certain assumption/issues/culture/ideas. For example, a blind individual will have a different perspective on everyday life compared to a deaf person. However, what remains important is the way to analyze these different embodiments of knowledge to come to a widely believed understanding of a particular culture, symbolic object, or something as simple as a definition.
I guess this whole idea can relate to why theorists have a difficult time coming up with a definition of ‘religion’. More particular, one can understand why theorists try to come up with a definition that tries to find a common ground or framework between the religions of the world.
When Young points out that interpretation is based on collective interests, it points to the idea that facts are not only dependent on a patriarchal position for true claims, because it seizes to be a fact given that it leaves out other perspectives, whether that be women’s or someone form a lower social standing. To summarize, not all perspectives are equal but by reducing a complex set of perspectives to a more simple ‘widely-believed’ perspective makes the nature of what a fact really is come to life. Put more specifically, fact is no longer ‘short’, because it manages to analyze a set of perspectives and then find a ground of commonality to set that fact into a structure.
Having said this, I believe that the study of religion should employ a similar method. That is, the more perspectives, ideas or experiences that are given, whether that is a woman or an outsider engaging in a religious experience to the specific culture under study, brings this idea of a fact to life. In other words, not only does the culture become more informative, but also, a more accurate portrayal of that culture is assumed. Specifically, a collective definition of what a particular religion is rather than one just from elite men makes that religion more ‘real’ and accommodating.
This brings me to the question of the relationship between embodiment and knowledge. I definitely agree with the assertion that knowledge is directly related to its type of embodiment. Embodiment is “the tangible or visible expression of an idea or quality” (Oxford), where knowledge is “a general awareness or possession of information, facts ideas, truths, or principles” (Oxford). The very fact that knowledge and embodiment is related explains why there are different perspectives on certain assumption/issues/culture/ideas. For example, a blind individual will have a different perspective on everyday life compared to a deaf person. However, what remains important is the way to analyze these different embodiments of knowledge to come to a widely believed understanding of a particular culture, symbolic object, or something as simple as a definition.
I guess this whole idea can relate to why theorists have a difficult time coming up with a definition of ‘religion’. More particular, one can understand why theorists try to come up with a definition that tries to find a common ground or framework between the religions of the world.
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